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Building Decision Procedures in the
Calculus of Inductive Constructions
Fre´de´ric Blanqui∗, Jean-Pierre Jouannaud†and Pierre-Yves Strub†
Abstract
It is commonly agreed that the success of future proof assistants will
rely on their ability to incorporate computations within deduction in order
to mimic the mathematician when replacing the proof of a proposition P
by the proof of an equivalent proposition P’ obtained from P thanks to
possibly complex calculations.
In this paper, we investigate a new version of the calculus of induc-
tive constructions which incorporates arbitrary decision procedures into
deduction via the conversion rule of the calculus. The novelty of the
problem in the context of the calculus of inductive constructions lies in
the fact that the computation mechanism varies along proof-checking:
goals are sent to the decision procedure together with the set of user hy-
potheses available from the current context. Our main result shows that
this extension of the calculus of constructions does not compromise its
main properties: confluence, subject reduction, strong normalization and
consistency are all preserved.
Keywords. Calculus of Inductive Constructions, Decision proce-
dures, Theorem provers
1 Introduction
Background. It is commonly agreed that the success of future proof assistants
will rely on their ability to incorporate computations within deduction in order
to mimic the mathematician when replacing the proof of a proposition P by
the proof of an equivalent proposition P’ obtained from P thanks to possibly
complex calculations.
Proof assistants based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism such as Coq [9]
allow to build the proof of a proposition by applying appropriate proof tactics
generating a proof term that can be checked with respect to the rules of logic.
The proof-checker, also called the kernel of the proof assistant, implements
the inference and deduction rules of the logic on top of a term manipulation
layer. Trusting the kernel is vital since the mathematical correctness of a proof
development relies entirely on the kernel.
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The (intuitionist) logic on which Coq is based is the Calculus of Construc-
tions (CC) of Coquand and Huet [10], an impredicative type theory incorpo-
rating polymorphism, dependent types and type constructors. As other logics,
CC enjoys a computation mechanism called cut-elimination, which is nothing
but the β-reduction rule of the underlying λ-calculus. But unlike logics without
dependent types, CC enjoys also a powerful type-checking rule, called conver-
sion, which incorporates computations within deduction, making decidability of
type-checking a non-trivial property of the calculus.
The traditional view that computations coincide with β-reductions suffers
several drawbacks. A methodological one is that the user must encode other
forms of computations as deduction, which is usually done by using appropriate,
complex tactics. A practical one is that proofs become much larger than neces-
sary, up to a point that they cannot be type-checked anymore. These questions
become extremely important when carrying out complex developments involv-
ing a large amount of computation as the formal proof of the four colour (now
proof-checked) theorem completed by Gonthier and Werner using Coq [14].
The Calculus of Inductive Constructions of Coquand and Paulin was a first
attempt to solve this problem by introducing inductive types and the associated
elimination rules [11]. The recent versions of Coq are based on a slight gener-
alization of this calculus [13]. Besides the β-reduction rule, they also include
the so-called ι-reductions which are recursors for terms and types. While the
kernel of CC is extremely compact and simple enough to make it easily readable
-hence trustable-, the kernel of CIC is much larger and quite complex. Trusting
it would require a formal proof, which was done once [3]. Updating that proof
for each new release of the system is however unrealistic. CIC does not solve
our problem, though, since such a simple function as reverse of a dependent list
cannot be defined in CIC because a :: l and l :: a, assuming :: is list concatena-
tion and the element a can be coerced to a list of length 1, have non-convertible
types list(n+ 1) and list(1 + n).
A more general attempt was carried out since the early 90’s, by adding user-
defined computations as rewrite rules, resulting in the Calculus of Algebraic
Constructions [6]. Although conceptually quite powerful, since CAC captures
CIC [7], this paradigm does not yet fulfill all needs, because the set of user-
defined rewrite rules must satisfy several strong assumptions. No implementa-
tion of CAC has indeed been released because making type-checking efficient
would require compiling the user-defined rules, a complex task resulting in a
kernel too large to be trusted anymore.
The proof assistant PVS uses a potentially stronger paradigm than Coq by
combining its deduction mechanism1 with a notion of computation based on the
powerful Shostak’s method for combining decision procedures [19], a framework
dubbed little proof engines by Shankar [18]: the little proof engines are the
decision procedures, required to be convex, combined by Shostak’s algorithm.
A given decision procedure encodes a fixed set of axioms P . But an important
advantage of the method is that the relevant assumptions A present in the
context of the proof are also used by the decision procedure to prove a goal G,
and become therefore part of the notion of computation. For example, in the
case where the little proof engines is the congruence closure algorithm, the fixed
1PVS logic is not based on Curry-Howard and proof-checking is not even decidable making
both frameworks very different and difficult to compare.
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set of axioms P is made of the axioms for equality, A is the set of algebraic
ground equalities declared in the context, while the goal G is an equality s = t
between two ground expressions. The congruence closure algorithm will then
process A and s = t together in order to decide whether or not s = t follows
from P ∪ A. In the Calculus of Constructions, this proof must be constructed
by a specific tactic called by the user, which applies the inference rules of CC
to the axioms in P and the assumptions in A, and becomes then part of the
proof term being built. Reflexion techniques allow to omit checking this proof
term by proving the decision procedure itself, but the soundness of the entire
mechanism cannot be guaranteed [12].
Two further steps in the direction of integrating decision procedures into the
Calculus of Constructions are Stehr’s Open Calculus of Constructions OCC [20]
and Oury’s Extensional Calculus of Constructions [16]. Implemented in Maude,
OCC allows for the use of an arbitrary equational theory in conversion. ECC
can be seen as a particular case of OCC in which all provable equalities can be
used in conversion, which can also be achieved by adding the extensionality and
Streicher’s axiom [15] to CIC, hence the name of this calculus. Unfortunately,
strong normalization and decidability of type checking are lost in ECC (and
OCC), which shows that we should look for more restrictive extensions. In
a preliminary work, we also designed a new, quite restrictive framework, the
Calculus of Congruent Constructions (CCC), which incorporates the congruence
closure algorithm in CC’s conversion [8], while preserving the good properties
of the calculus, including the decidability of type checking.
Problem. The main question investigated in this paper is the incorporation
of a general mechanism calling a decision procedure for solving conversion-goals
in the Calculus of Inductive Constructions which uses the relevant information
available from the current context of the proof.
Contributions. Our main contribution is the definition and the meta-theoretical
investigation of the Calculus of Congruent Inductive Constructions (CCIC),
which incorporates arbitrary first-order theories for which entailment is decid-
able into deduction via an abstract conversion rule of the calculus. A major
technical innovation of this work lies in the computation mechanism: goals are
sent to the decision procedure together with the set of user hypotheses available
from the current context. Our main result shows that this extension of CIC
does not compromise its main properties: confluence, strong normalization, co-
herence and decidability of proof-checking are all preserved. Unlike previous
calculi, the main difficulty here is confluence, which led to a complex definition
of conversion as a fixpoint. As a consequence of this definition, decidability of
type checking becomes itself difficult.
Finally, we explain why the new system is still trustable, by leaving decision
procedures out of its kernel, assuming that each procedure delivers a checkable
certificate which becomes part of the proof. Certificate checkers become them-
selves part of the kernel, but are usually quite small and efficient and can be
added one by one, making this approach a good compromise between CIC and
the aforementioned extensions.
We assume some familiarity with typed lambda calculi [2] and the Calculus
of Inductive Constructions.
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2 The calculus
For ease of the presentation, we restrict ourselves to CCN, a calculus of construc-
tions with a type nat of natural numbers generated by its two constructors 0
and S and equipped with its weak recursor RecW
N
. The calculus is also equipped
with a polymorphic equality symbol =˙ for which we use here a mixfix notation,
writing t =˙T u (or even t =˙ u when T is not relevant) instead of =˙ T t u.
Let S = {⋆,,△} the set of CCN sorts. For s ∈ {⋆,}, X s denotes a
countably infinite set of s-sorted variables s.t. X ⋆∩X = ∅. The union X ⋆∪X
will be written X . For x ∈ X , we write sx the sort of x. Let A = {u, r} a set
of two constants called annotations, totally ordered by u ≺A r, where r stands
for restricted and u for unrestricted. We use a for an arbitrary annotation.
Definition 2.1 (Pseudo-terms of CCN). We define the pseudo-terms of CCN
by the grammar rules:
t, T := x ∈ X | s ∈ S | nat | =˙ | 0 | S | +˙ | Eq(t) | t u
| λ[x :a T ]t | ∀(x :a T ). t | RecW
N
(t, T ){t0, tS}
We use FV(t) for the set of free variables of t.
Definition 2.2 (Pseudo-contexts of CCN). The typing environments of CCN
are defined as Γ,∆ := [] | Γ, [x :a T ] s.t. a variable cannot appear twice. We use
dom(Γ) for the domain of Γ and xΓ for the type associated to x in Γ.
Remark that in our calculus, assumptions stored in the proof context always
come along with an annotation used to control whether they can be used (in
case the annotation is r) or not in a conversion goal. We will later point out
why this is necessary.
Definition 2.3 (Syntactic classes). The pairwise disjoint syntactic classes of
CCN, called objects (O), predicates or types (P), kinds (K), externs (E) and
△ are defined in Figure 1.
This enumeration defines a postfixed successor function +1 on classes (O+
1 = P, P + 1 = K, . . . ∆+ 1 =⊥) . We also define Class(t) = D if t ∈ D and
D ∈ {O,P ,K, E ,△} and Class(t) =⊥ otherwise.
Our typing judgments are classically written Γ ⊢ t : T , meaning that the
well formed term t is a proof of the proposition T under the assumptions in
the well-formed environment Γ. Typing rules are those of CIC restricted to the
single inductive type of natural numbers, with one exception, [Conv], based on
an equality relation called conversion defined in section 2.1.
Definition 2.4 (Typing). Typing rules of CCN are defined in Figure 2.
2.1 Computation by conversion
Our calculus has a complex notion of computation reflecting its rich structure
made of three different ingredients, the typed lambda calculus, the type nat
with its weak recursor and the Presburger arithmetic.
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O := X ⋆ | 0 | S | +˙ | OO | OP | [λX ⋆ :a P ]O |
:= [λX :a K]O | RecW
N
(O, ·){O,O}
P := X | nat | P O | P P | [λX ⋆ :a P ]P | =˙ |
:= [λX :a K]P | (∀X ⋆ :a P)P | (∀X :a K)P
K := ⋆ | KO | KP | [λX ⋆ :a P ]K |
:= [λX :a K]K | (∀X ⋆ :a P)K | (∀X :a K)K
E :=  | (∀X ⋆ :a P)E | (∀X :a K)E
△ := △
Figure 1: CCN terms classes
Our typed lambda calculus comes along with the β-rule. The η-rule raises
known technical difficulties, see [22].
The type nat is generated by the two constructors 0 and S whose typing rules
are given in Figure 2. We use RecW
N
for its weak recursor whose typing rule is
given in Figure 2 as well. Following CIC’s tradition, we separate their arguments
into two groups, using parentheses for the first two, and curly brackets for the
two branches. The computation rules of nat are given below:
Definition 2.5 (ι-reduction). The ι-reduction is defined by the following rewrit-
ing system:
RecWN (0, Q){t0, tS} →ι t0
RecWN (S t, Q){t0, tS} →ι tS t (Rec
W
N (t, Q){t0, tS})
where t0, tS ∈ O.
These rules are going to be part of the conversion ∼Γ. Of course, we do not
want to type-check terms at each single step of conversion, we want to type-
check only the starting two terms forming the equality goal in [Conv]. But
intermediate terms could then be non-typable and strong normalization be lost.
The constructors 0 and S, as well as the additional first-order constant +˙
are also used to build up expressions in the algebraic world of Presburger arith-
metic, in which function symbols have arities. We therefore have two different
possible views of terms of type nat, either as a term of the calculus of inductive
constructions, or as an algebraic term of Presburger arithmetic. We now de-
fine precisely this algebraic world and explain in detail how to extract algebraic
information from arbitrary terms of CCN.
Let T be the theory of Presburger arithmetic defined on the signature Σ =
{0, S( ), + } and Y a set of variables distinct from X . Note that we syntactically
distinguish the algebraic symbols from the CCN symbols by using a different font
(0 and S for the algebraic symbols, 0 and S for the constructors).
We write T  F if F is a valid formula in T , and T , E  F for T  E ⇒ F .
Definition 2.6 (Algebraic terms). The set Alg of CCN algebraic terms is the
smallest subset of O s.t. i) X ⋆ ⊆ Alg, ii) 0 ∈ Alg, iii) ∀t ∈ CCN.S t ∈ Alg,
iv) ∀t, u ∈ CCN. t +˙ u ∈ Alg.
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[Axiom-1]
⊢ ⋆ : 
[Axiom-2]
⊢  : △
[=˙-Intro]
⊢ =˙ : ∀(T :u ⋆). T → T → ⋆
[Product]
Γ ⊢ T : sT Γ, [x :
a T ] ⊢ U : sU
Γ ⊢ ∀(x :a T ). U : sU
[Lamda]
Γ ⊢ ∀(x :a T ). U : s Γ, [x :a T ] ⊢ u : U
Γ ⊢ λ[x :a T ]u : ∀(x :a T ). U
[Weak]
Γ ⊢ V : s Γ ⊢ t : T s ∈ {⋆,} x ∈ X s − dom(Γ)
Γ, [x :a V ] ⊢ t : T
[Var]
x ∈ dom(Γ) Γ ⊢ xΓ : sx
Γ ⊢ x : xΓ
[App]
Γ ⊢ t : ∀(x :a U). V Γ ⊢ u : U
if a = r and U →∗β t1 =˙T t2 with t1, t2 ∈ O
then t1 ∼Γ t2 must hold
Γ ⊢ t u : V {x 7→ u}
[0-Intro]
⊢ 0 : nat
[S-Intro]
⊢ S : nat→ nat
[Nat]
⊢ nat : ⋆
[+˙-Intro]
⊢ +˙ : nat→ nat→ nat
[Eq-Intro]
Γ ⊢ t1 : T Γ ⊢ t2 : T
Γ ⊢ p : ∀(P : T → ⋆). P t1 → P t2
Γ ⊢ Eq(p) : t1 =˙T t2
[ι-Elim]
Γ ⊢ t : nat Γ ⊢ Q : nat→ ⋆ Γ ⊢ f0 : nat
Γ ⊢ fS : ∀(n :
u nat). Q n→ Q (Sn)
Γ ⊢ RecWN (t, Q){f0, fS} : Q t
[Conv]
Γ ⊢ t : T Γ ⊢ T ′ : s′ T ∼Γ T
′
Γ ⊢ t : T ′
Figure 2: Typing judgment of CCN
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Definition 2.7 (Algebraic cap and aliens). Given a relation R on CCN, let R
be the smallest congruence on CCN containing R, and πR a function from CCN
to Y ∪ X ⋆ such that t R u ⇐⇒ πR(t) = πR(u).
The algebraic cap of t modulo R, capR(t), is defined by:
• capR(0) = 0, capR(Su) = S(capR(u)), capR(u +˙ v) = capR(u)+capR(v),
• otherwise, capR(t) = t if t ∈ X
∗ and else πR(t).
We call aliens the subterms of t abstracted by a variable in Y.
Observe that a term not headed by an algebraic symbol is abstracted by a
variable from our new set of variables Y in such a way that R-equivalent terms
are abstracted by the same variable.
We can now glue things together to define conversion.
Definition 2.8 (Conversion relation). The family {∼Γ}Γ of Γ-conversions is
defined by the rules of Figure 3.
This definition is technically complex.
Being a congruence, ∼Γ includes congruence rules. However, all these rules
are not quite congruence rules since crossing a binder increases the current
context Γ by the new assumption made inside the scope of the binding construct,
resulting in a family of congruences. More questions are raised by the three
different kinds of basic conversions.
First, ∼Γ includes the rules →β and →ι of CCN. Unlike the beta rule, →ι
interacts with first-order rewriting, and therefore the Conv rule of Figure 2
cannot be expressed by T ↔∗βι∼Γ↔
∗
βι T
′ as one would expect.
Second, ∼Γ includes the relevant assumptions grabbed from the context, this
is rule Eq. These assumptions must be of the form [x :r T ], with the appropriate
annotation r, and T must be an equality assumption or otherwise reduce to an
equality assumption. Note that we use only →β here. Using ∼Γ recursively
instead is indeed an equivalent formulation under our assumptions. Without
annotations, CCN does not enjoy subject reduction. Generating appropriate
annotations is discussed in section 4.
Third, with rule [Ded], we can also generate new assumptions by using
Presburger arithmetic. This rule here uses the property that two algebraic
terms are equivalent in ∼Γ if their caps relative to ∼Γ are equivalent in ∼Γ
(the converse being false). This is so because the abstraction function π∼Γ
abstracts equivalent aliens by the same variable taken from Y. It is therefore
the case that deductions on caps made in Presburger arithmetic can be lifted to
deductions on arbitrary terms via the abstraction function. As a consequence,
the two definitions of the abstraction function π∼Γ and of the congruence ∼Γ
are mutually inductive: our conversion relation is defined as a least fixpoint.
2.2 Two simple examples
More automation - smaller proofs. We start with a simple example illus-
trating how the equalities extracted from a context Γ can be use to deduce new
equalities in ∼Γ.
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[βι]
t↔∗βι u
t ∼Γ u
[Eq]
[x :r T ] ∈ Γ T →∗β t1 =˙ t2 t1, t2 ∈ O
t1 ∼Γ t2
[Ded]
t1, t2 ∈ O
T , {cap∼Γ(u1) = cap∼Γ(u2) | u1 ∼Γ u2}  cap∼Γ(t1) = cap∼Γ(t2)
t1 ∼Γ t2
[Sym]
t ∼Γ u
u ∼Γ t
[Trans]
t ∼Γ u u ∼Γ v
t ∼Γ v
[CCN-Eq]
t ∼Γ u
Eq(t) ∼Γ Eq(u)
[App]
t1 ∼Γ t2 u1 ∼Γ u2
t1 u1 ∼Γ t2 u2
[Prod]
T ∼Γ U t ∼Γ,[x:aT ] u b  a
∀(x :b T ). t ∼Γ ∀(x :
b U). u
[Lam]
T ∼Γ U t ∼Γ,[x:aT ] u b  a
λ[x :b T ]t ∼Γ λ[x :
b U ]u
[Elim-W]
t ∼Γ u P ∼Γ Q t0 ∼Γ u0 tS ∼Γ uS
RecWN (t, P ){t0, tS} ∼Γ Rec
W
N (u,Q){u0, uS}
Figure 3: Conversion relation ∼Γ
Γ = [x y t :u nat], [f :u nat→ nat],
[p1 :
r t =˙ 2], [p2 :
r f (x +˙ 3) =˙ x +˙ 2],
[p3 :
r f (y +˙ t) +˙ 2 =˙ y], [p4 :
r y +˙ 1 =˙ x +˙ 2]
From p1 and p4 (extracted from the context by [Eq]), [Ded] will deduce
that y +˙ t ∼Γ x +˙ 3, and by congruence, f (y +˙ t) ∼Γ f (x +˙ 3). Therefore,
π∼Γ will abstract f(x +˙ 3) and f(y +˙ t) by the same variable z, resulting in two
new equations available for [Ded]: z = x + 2 and z + 2 = y. Now, z = x + 2,
z+2 = y and y+1 = x+2 form a set of unsatisfiable equations and we deduce
0 ∼Γ 1 by the Ded rule: contradiction has been obtained. This shows that we
can easily carry out a proof by contradiction in T .
More typable terms. We continue with a second example showing that the
new calculus can type more terms than CIC. For the sake of this example we
assume that the calculus is extended by dependent lists on natural numbers.
We denote by list (of type nat → ⋆) the type of dependent lists and by nil
(of type list0) and cons (of type ∀(n : nat). listn → nat → list (Sn)) the
lists constructors. We also add a weak recursor RecWL such that, given P :
∀(n : nat). listn → ⋆, l0 : P 0nil and lS : ∀(n : nat)(l : listn). P n l → ∀(x :
nat). P (Sn) (consnx l), then RecW
L
(l, P ){l0, lS} has type P n l for any list l of
type listn.
Assume now given a dependent reverse function (of type ∀(n : nat). listn→
listn) and the list concatenation function @ (of type ∀(nn′ : nat), listn →
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listn′ → list (n +˙ n′)). We can simply express that a list l is a palindrome: l is
a palindrome if reverse l =˙ l.
Suppose now that one wants to prove that palindromes are closed under
substitution of letters by palindromes. To make it easier, we will simply consider
a particular case: the list l1l2l2l1 is a palindrome if l1 and l2 are palindromes.
The proof sketch is simple: it suffices to apply as many times as needed the
lemma reverse(ll′) = reverse(l′)@ reverse(l) (∗). What can be quite surprising is
that Lemma (∗) is rejected by Coq. Indeed, if l and l′ are of length n and n′, it is
easy to check that reverse(ll′) is of type list (n +˙ n′) and reverse(l′) :: reverse(l)
of type list (n′ +˙n) which are clearly not βι-convertible. This is not true in our
system: n +˙n′ will of course be convertible to n′ +˙n and lemma (∗) is therefore
well-formed. Proving the more general property needs of course an additional
induction on natural numbers to apply lemma (∗) the appropriate number of
times, which can of course be carried out in our system.
Note that, although possible, writing a reverse function for dependent lists in
Coq is not that simple. Indeed, a direct inductive definition of reverse will define
reverse(consn a l), of type list (1+˙n), as reverse(l) @ a, of type list (n+˙1). Coq
will reject such a definition since list (1 +˙n) and list (n +˙ 1) are not convertible.
Figure 4 shows how reverse can be defined in Coq.
Coq < Definition reverse: forall (n: nat), (list n) -> (list n) .
Coq < assert (reverse acc : forall (n m : nat),
Coq < list n -> list m -> list (m+n)) .
Coq < refine (fix reverse acc (n m : nat) (from : list n) (to : list m)
Coq < {struct from} : list (m+n) := ) .
Coq < destruct from as [ | n’ v rest ] .
Coq < rewrite <- plus n 0 transparent; exact to .
Coq < rewrite <- plus n Sm transparent;
Coq < exact (reverse acc n’ (S m) rest (cons v to)) .
Coq < intros n l . exact (reverse acc l nil) .
Coq < Defined .
Figure 4: reverse function is Coq
3 Metatheorical properties
Most basic properties of Pure Type Systems (see [5]) are not too difficult. Those
using substitution instances are more delicate. They rely on the annotations dec-
orating the abstractions and products which were introduced for that purpose.
3.1 Stability by substitution
Assume that Γ is a typing environment of the form Γ1, [p :
r a =˙ b],Γ2 (a and
b being two variables of type nat in Γ). The stability by substitution claims
that if we have a typing derivation Γ ⊢ t : T , then we can substitute p by
a term P (of type a =˙ b under Γ1) in this derivation and obtain a proof of
Γ1,Γ2θ ⊢ tθ : Tθ, where θ is the substitution {p 7→ P}. This property can easily
be proved for Pure Type Systems as soon as the conversion relation is itself
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stable by substitution. In our example one can easily check that a ∼Γ b, but
a ∼Γ1,Γ2θ b will not hold in general: the assumption a =˙ b has been inlined and
thus is no more extractable by the conversion relation. As a result, we need to
strengthen the formulation of stability by substitution:
Lemma 3.1. Let Γ = Γ1, [z :
a W ],Γ2 and assume that i) T ∼Γ T ′, ii) if a = r
and W →∗β t1 =˙ t2 then t1 ∼Γ1 t2. Then, Tθ ∼∆ T
′θ where θ = {z 7→ w} and
∆ = Γ1,Γ2θ
Corollary 3.2 (Stability by substitution). Let Γ = Γ1, [z :
a W ],Γ2 and assume
that i) T ∼Γ T ′ ii) if a = r and W →∗β t1 =˙ t2 then t1 ∼Γ1 t2. Then, ∆ ⊢ tθ : Tθ
where θ = {z 7→ w}, Γ1 ⊢ w : W and ∆ = Γ1,Γ2θ.
As usual, the substitutivity lemma is to be used in the proof of subject
reduction (for→βι) to come later. Because it requires a specific typing property
for the equality assumptions annotated by r, we need to ensure this property in
the application case of the coming subject reduction proof. This is indeed the
origin of the similar condition arising in the typing rule [App].
3.2 Conversion as rewriting
We now turn conversion into a rewriting relation in order to prove that our
system is logically consistent by analyzing a proof in normal form of ∀(x :u ⋆). x.
The notion of a normal proof is of course more complicated than in CIC, since
we must account for the congruence ∼Γ associated with an arbitrary context
Γ. The difficulty is that the set of equalities assumed in a given environment
Γ together with the axioms of the theory T may be inconsistent, making all
first-order terms equal in ∼Γ which could break strong normalization of our
rewriting relation.
Definition 3.3 (T -consistent environment). A typing environment Γ is T -
consistent if there exist two terms t, u ∈ O s.t. ¬(t ∼Γ u).
Lemma 3.4. If Γ is T -consistent then ¬(0 ∼Γ S t) for any term t.
Definition 3.5 (Weak conversion). We inductively define a family of weak
conversion relations {∼=Γ}Γ as the smallest congruent relation s.t. t ∼=Γ u if
T ,Eq(Γ)  cap∅(t) = cap∅(u), where Eq(Γ) = {cap∅(w1) = cap∅(w2) | w1, w2 ∈
O, [x :r w1 =˙ w2] ∈ Γ}.
Definition 3.6. We inductively define a family {→Γ}Γ of rewriting relations
modulo weak-conversion as the smallest rewriting relations satisfying the rules
of Figure 5.
The first rule shows that rewriting is modulo weak conversion in a consistent
environment. The second equates all object terms when the environment is
inconsistent, replacing them by the new constant •. The others are as expected.
Lemma 3.7. 1. The rewriting relation →Γ is confluent.
2. If t ∼Γ u then t↔∗Γ u.
3. If t↔∗Γ u with • 6∈ t and • 6∈ u then t ∼Γ u.
4. If Γ ⊢ t : T with Γ T -consistent and t ∼=Γ u, then Γ ⊢ u : T .
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[Rw-Mod]
Γ is T -consistent t ∼=Γ t
′ →Γ u
′ ∼=Γ u
t→Γ u
[Rw-•]
Γ is T -inconsistent t ∈ O t 6= •
t→Γ •
[Rw-βι]
t→βι u
t→Γ u
[Rw-Fwd]
t→∆ u Γ→β ∆
t→Γ u
[W-∀]
t→Γ,[x:aT ] u b  a
∀(x :b T ). t→Γ ∀(x :
b T ). u
[W-λ]
t→Γ,[x:aT ] u b  a
λ[x :b T ]. t→Γ λ[x :
b T ]. u
Figure 5: Conversion as a rewriting system
Lemma 3.8. If Γ ⊢ t : T and t→Γ u with • 6∈ u, then Γ ⊢ u : T .
Proof. The proof is standard, by induction on the type derivation of the left-
hand side. The interesting case is when a β-reduction applies to the top of a
term of the form (λ[x :a U ]v) w and the typing rule is [App]: we then conclude
by using Lemma 3.2. Note that the side condition of rule [App] provides us
with the property needed for using Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.9. The rewriting relation →Γ is strongly normalizing for well formed
terms.
Proof. The proof is a direct application of proof irrelevance [4], because ∼Γ is
a congruence generated by equalities between object terms, apart from beta-
reduction. What makes this true is that RecW
N
is a weak recursor, working at
the object level. Including strong elimination rules invalidates this argument.
We finally conclude that CCN is consistent:
Theorem 3.1. There is no proof of ⊢ t : ∀(x :u ⋆). x.
Proof. Assume that ⊢ t : 0 =˙ S0 where t is →Γ-normal. Since 0 =˙ S0 is not
convertible to a sort, t cannot be equal to nat, or a sort, or a product. Since
t is necessarily closed, t is not a variable. Moreover, t cannot be of the form
RecW
N
(u,Q){t0, tS} since t is closed and in →ι-normal form.
If t is an application, it is necessarily of the form c ~u with c ∈ {0,S, +˙, =˙}.
By using inversion it suffices to check that in all these cases, t has a type T
which is not convertible to 0 =˙ S0.
If t = Eq(u), then t has type u =˙ u with u of type nat and u =˙ u convertible
to 0 =˙ S0. Thus 0 ∼[] S0, and T  0 = 1, which is impossible.
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3.3 Decidability of type checking
Theorem 3.2. Type checking of CCN is decidable.
Decidability of type checking needs two ingredients. First-of-all, eliminating
[Conv], which is non-structural, by incorporating it to [App]. This is classical,
and it is easy to prove decidability of the transformed set of rules for type-
checking, assuming ∼Γ is decidable.
Deciding ∼Γ is more complex. We cannot use the rewrite system→Γ for that
purpose since the first two rules use the T -consistency of Γ as a prerequisite.
We use instead a saturation based algorithm. The method resembles very much
the one used for combining first-order decision procedures operating on disjoint
alphabets [17, 1]. Basic ingredients are: purification of formulas (here equations)
by abstracting aliens by new variables; deriving new equalities among variables
by using the appropriate decision procedure for pure formulas; propagating these
new equalities to the other formulas.
4 Conclusion and discussion
CCN is an extension of CIC (restricted to the weak elimination rules of the
inductive type nat) by a fragment of Presburger arithmetic (without the nat-
ural strict order N) in which conversion incorporates Presburger arithmetic,
β-reduction and higher-order primitive recursion into a single mechanism. We
now discuss in more details how this can be generalized to full CIC, how this
can be used in practice, how useful that is, and whether the obtained kernel is
trustable.
Relevance. Our second example shows very clearly the expressivity of our
calculus with respect to CIC. However, what is done here by a typing rule could
be done alternatively in CIC by a tactic. Besides, if one wants to avoid building
a proof term which can be quite large and slow down the type-checker, it is
possible to prove the tactic and then use a reflexion mechanism in order to avoid
type-checking the proof each time the tactic is called. In both cases, however,
the user must call the tactic explicitly. In our approach, this is completely
transparent, and would remain transparent in case of a succession of uses of
the decision procedure separated by eliminations, since conversion incorporates
both, or in case of different decision procedures called successively.
Extension to CIC. Building decision procedures in a type-theoretic frame-
work is not that easy. The main difficulty lies in the adequate definition of
the congruence ∼Γ. Once the definition is obtained, carrying out the technical
development is not too difficult in the case of the pure Calculus of Construc-
tions (the congruence becomes quite simpler in this case), difficult in the present
case of CCN (because of the presence of the weak recursors for nat), no more
difficult when other decidable theories are introduced such as lists with their
associated recursors, but much harder when including strong elimination rules
which interact with the first-order theories. In this case, it is necessary to block
the congruence below the strong recursor in order to avoid lifting an incoher-
ence from the object level to the predicate level, which would immediately yield
paradoxes [21].
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Annotations restriction One may wonder how annotations can be handled
in practice. As seen, annotations are used to forbid inlining (when a β-redex
is contracted) of equational assumptions which are used by conversion. This
could be seen as a restriction since our calculus, in order to avoid the creation
of problematic β-redexes, forbids in most cases applications of symbols of type
∀(p :r t =˙ u). T .
This restriction can be removed by using the notion of opaque definitions
(as opposed to transparent definitions) of Coq which allows the user to define
symbols that the system cannot inline. In most cases, definitions having a com-
putational behavior (like +˙) are transparent whereas definitions representing
lemmas (like the associativity of +˙) are opaque. This convention is used in the
standard library of Coq.
Returning to our previous example, if the user needs to prove a lemma of
the form ∀(p :r t =˙ u). T , he or she should declare it as an opaque definition
P := λ[p :r t =˙ u]q. The application of P to a term v should then be allowed:
the term P v cannot reduce to q{p 7→ v}. Of course, if P is defined transparently,
the application P v has to be forbidden.
Moreover, this gives us a simple heuristic to automatically tag products and
abstractions: r annotation should by used by default when the user is defining
an opaque symbol, whereas u annotation should be used everywhere else.
Arbitrary decision procedures. So far, we have considered only decidable
equational theories. But it is well-known that a decidable theory can always
be transformed into a decidable equational theory over the type Bool of truth
values equipped with its usual operations. This is so because of the decidability
assumption.
Type levels equalities. One may wonder whether the conversion relation of
CCN could use type level equalities (or hypotheses of the form P ↔ Q). The
answer seems to be negative: extracting type levels equalities breaks subject
reduction and β-strong normalization (see [16]), two properties needed for the
decidability of our calculus.
Trusting the kernel. Decision procedures require complex coding. It took a
lot of time to get a correct tactic for Presburger arithmetic in Coq. Including
a tactic into the kernel of the system is therefore unrealistic, unless it is itself
proved correct with a trustable proof assistant. On the other hand, most decision
procedures can provide a certificate that is quite compact and can be verified
by a certificate-checker which is usually small, and easy to write and read, and
is therefore a trustable piece of code. The reason is that the procedure searches
for a proof while the certificate-checker verifies that the certificate is correct. A
certificate checker looks indeed like a proof-checker. It is then easy to modify
the conversion rule so as to output a certificate each time a decision procedure
is used. The kernel of CCN should therefore include a certificate-checker for
Presburger arithmetic. In case of CCIC with several decision procedures, the
kernel would include one proof-checker for each decision procedure. Besides, the
process is incremental: the procedures and the associated proof-checkers can be
included one by one, because decision procedures for different inductive types
operate on disjoint vocabularies, hence can be combined [17, 1].
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An implementation of CCIC has started and should be available soon as a
prototype in a version without certificate generation and checking.
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